COMMUNICATIONS

FOIA

1. **DESNZ Ministerial Briefing Notes (January 1, 2024–March 10, 2025)**: Notes prepared for the Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero on the 100MW threshold rationale for onshore wind and solar projects, including comparisons with the 150MW wind threshold consulted upon. These could reveal inadequate reasoning or failure to consider alternatives, supporting irrationality and illegality claims (referenced in FOIA DES 250423.txt, DES COMPLAINT_250423.txt).

2. **DESNZ Consultation Response Analysis (2024–March 2025)**: Full dataset or summary of stakeholder responses to the 2024 consultation on the Order, categorized by type (e.g., local authorities, NGOs, public) and detailing how responses were weighed, especially those raising environmental or local democracy concerns. This supports procedural impropriety claims (FOIA DES 250423.txt, DES COMPLAINT_250423.txt).

3. **Inter-Departmental Correspondence (DESNZ, MHCLG, DEFRA, January 1, 2024–March 10, 2025)**: Emails, minutes, or memos between DESNZ, MHCLG, and DEFRA on the Order’s impact on local planning, environmental duties, and BMV land. This could expose coordination failures or suppressed concerns, supporting illegality and statutory duty claims (mhclg FOIA_250423.txt, defra foia_250423.txt).

4. **Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) for NSIP Projects (March–June 2025)**: EIAs for >100MW wind/solar projects approved under the NSIP regime, including biodiversity and landscape impact assessments. These could show inadequate mitigation, supporting nuisance and statutory duty claims (defra complaint_250423.txt, windsolar.cocoo.uk).

5. **DEFRA’s Food Security and BMV Land Analysis (2024–June 2025)**: Reports or assessments on cumulative BMV land loss due to solar projects, aligning with food security strategies. This supports statutory duty breaches under the Environment Act 2021 (defra complaint_250423.txt, defra foia_250423.txt).

6. **MHCLG Guidance for Local Planning Authorities (March–June 2025)**: Guidance or support materials for LPAs handling 50-100MW solar projects, including cumulative impact assessments. This could reveal resource strains, supporting procedural impropriety (mhclg complaint_250423.txt, mhclg FOIA_250423.txt).

7. **DESNZ Whole-System Cost Analysis (2024–March 2025)**: Analyses of grid balancing, backup generation, or curtailment costs for increased wind/solar deployment under the Order. This supports irrationality claims if costs were ignored (FOIA DES 250423.txt, DES COMPLAINT_250423.txt).

8. **Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) for the Order (2024–March 2025)**: The SEA conducted under the Environmental Assessment of Plans and Programmes Regulations 2004, detailing environmental considerations. This could expose inadequate assessments, supporting illegality (DES COMPLAINT_250423.txt).

**Questions to Ask Under FOIA/EIR**

These questions are crafted to elicit specific recorded information, ensuring compliance with FOIA/EIR requirements (e.g., requesting existing documents, avoiding speculative queries). They address key case issues and are informed by prior documents and findings (e.g., 15% BMV land loss, consultation gaps, market concentration):

1. What ministerial briefing notes or policy papers, dated January 1, 2024–March 10, 2025, document the rationale for selecting the 100MW threshold for onshore wind and solar projects in the Order, including comparisons with the 150MW wind threshold consulted upon?
2. What dataset or summary of the 2024 consultation responses for the Order, categorized by stakeholder type (e.g., local authorities, NGOs, public), details how concerns about protected landscapes, BMV land, and local democracy were considered and weighed in the decision-making process?
3. What emails, meeting minutes, or memos between DESNZ, MHCLG, and DEFRA, dated January 1, 2024–March 10, 2025, discuss the Order’s impact on local planning principles, National Parks/AONBs, or BMV land protection?
4. What EIAs or biodiversity assessments for >100MW wind/solar NSIP projects approved between March and June 2025 address impacts on protected species (e.g., raptors) or designated landscapes, and what mitigation measures were mandated?
5. What DEFRA reports or assessments, dated 2024–June 2025, quantify cumulative BMV land loss due to solar projects under the Order and evaluate alignment with food security strategies?
6. What MHCLG guidance or support materials, issued March–June 2025, assist LPAs in assessing 50-100MW solar projects, particularly regarding cumulative impacts and grid connection issues?
7. What analyses, dated 2024–March 2025, assess whole-system costs (e.g., grid balancing, curtailment) of the Order’s planning changes for wind/solar deployment?
8. What SEA, conducted under the 2004 Regulations, was prepared for the Order, and how were its environmental findings incorporated into the decision-making process?

**FOIA/EIR Considerations**

– **FOIA/EIR Applicability**: EIR applies to environmental information (e.g., EIAs, BMV land data, SEAs), while FOIA covers non-environmental records (e.g., consultation summaries, briefing notes). Both are used to maximize disclosure, as EIR has a stronger presumption of release (Regulation 12).
– **Avoiding Exemptions**: Requests are specific, targeting existing documents to avoid section 12 (cost limits) or section 14 (vexatious) FOIA refusals. EIR’s “manifestly unreasonable” exemption is mitigated by narrowing scope to 2024–2025 and specific topics. Section 35 (policy formulation) may apply to briefing notes, but partial disclosure of severable information is requested. Section 43 (commercial interests) could affect tender data, but public interest in transparency outweighs exemptions, especially for environmental data.
– **Public Interest**: The requests emphasize public interest in transparency, local democracy, and environmental protection, aligning with COCOO’s mission and increasing disclosure likelihood.

**Draft FOIA/EIR Letter**

18 July 2025

Information Rights Team
Department for Energy Security and Net Zero
foi.requests@energysecurity.gov.uk

Dear Information Rights Team,

Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and Environmental Information Regulations 2004, I request the following recorded information relating to the development and implementation of the Infrastructure Planning (Onshore Wind and Solar Generation) Order 2025, laid before Parliament on 10 March 2025. If this letter does not reach the intended recipient, please forward it to the relevant department internally, as required by EU law (Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001).

1. Ministerial briefing notes or policy papers, dated 1 January 2024–10 March 2025, documenting the rationale for selecting the 100MW threshold for onshore wind and solar projects, including comparisons with the 150MW wind threshold consulted upon.
2. Dataset or summary of 2024 consultation responses for the Order, categorized by stakeholder type (e.g., local authorities, NGOs, public), detailing how concerns about protected landscapes, best and most versatile (BMV) agricultural land, and local democracy were considered and weighed.
3. Emails, meeting minutes, or memos between DESNZ, MHCLG, and DEFRA, dated 1 January 2024–10 March 2025, discussing the Order’s impact on local planning principles, National Parks/AONBs, or BMV land protection.
4. Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) or biodiversity assessments for >100MW wind/solar NSIP projects approved between March and June 2025, addressing impacts on protected species (e.g., raptors) or designated landscapes, and specifying mitigation measures.
5. DEFRA reports or assessments, dated 2024–June 2025, quantifying cumulative BMV land loss due to solar projects under the Order and evaluating alignment with food security strategies.
6. MHCLG guidance or support materials, issued March–June 2025, assisting Local Planning Authorities in assessing 50-100MW solar projects, particularly regarding cumulative impacts and grid connection issues.
7. Analyses, dated 2024–March 2025, assessing whole-system costs (e.g., grid balancing, curtailment) of the Order’s planning changes for wind/solar deployment.
8. Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), conducted under the Environmental Assessment of Plans and Programmes Regulations 2004, prepared for the Order, and details of how its environmental findings were incorporated into decision-making.

Please provide the information in electronic format. If any part of this request is unclear, please contact me at contact@cocoo.uk to clarify before refusing. If information is exempt, please specify the exemption (e.g., FOIA section 35, EIR Regulation 12) and release any reasonably severable non-exempt information. The public interest in transparency, local democracy, and environmental protection supports disclosure, particularly for environmental data under EIR.

Yours sincerely,
Oscar Moya LLedo
23 Village Way, Beckenham, BR3 3NA, United Kingdom
Email: contact@cocoo.uk

**Additional Recommendations**

– **Follow-Up Actions**: Monitor DESNZ’s response (due within 20 working days under FOIA/EIR). If responses are incomplete or exempt, appeal to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ico.org.uk). Submit parallel EIRs to DEFRA (defra.helpline@defra.gov.uk) and MHCLG (FOI@communities.gov.uk) for inter-departmental records.
– **Cross-Referencing**: Use responses to cross-reference with planninginspectorate.gov.uk for NSIP project details, RenewableUK’s database for market share, and CPRE/Friends of the Earth for community impact data. Verify consultation gaps with petition.parliament.uk submissions.
– **Legal Strategy**: Incorporate disclosed documents into judicial review submissions to evidence procedural flaws (e.g., missing SEAs, inadequate consultation). Use BMV land data for tort claims and market share evidence for competition law filings in the CAT. In mediation, leverage consultation and environmental deficiencies to demand revised thresholds or community funds.
– **Litigation Funding**: Present FOIA/EIR responses to funders (e.g., Harbour Litigation Funding, info@harbourlf.com) to demonstrate strong evidence, increasing claim assignment viability.

These requests and questions are designed to maximize disclosure while navigating FOIA/EIR limitations, directly supporting COCOO’s legal and mediation strategies with granular evidence.

PROMPT: READ CHAT HISTORY. THEN , TO IMPROVE OUR CHANCES TO WIN THIS CASE AND CONTRACT AND MEDIATION , GIVE ME A LIST OF QUESTIONS YOU WOULD ASK (IF YOU COULD) ANYONE , AND SAY TO WHOM YOU WOULD ASK, AND THE LIST OF POSSIBLE ANSWERS YOU COULD GET

1. **To: DESNZ Senior Policy Advisor (via FOIA/EIR to foi.requests@energysecurity.gov.uk)**
**Question**: What specific analyses or modeling supported the selection of the 100MW threshold for onshore wind and solar projects in the Infrastructure Planning Order 2025, and what alternatives were considered?
**Possible Answers**:
– A detailed report exists but was not publicly disclosed, revealing limited or no alternative thresholds (e.g., 50MW, 150MW) were assessed, supporting COCOO’s irrationality claim.
– No formal analysis was conducted, relying on ministerial discretion, strengthening illegality and procedural impropriety arguments.
– Partial analysis exists but omits environmental or community impacts, supporting breach of statutory duty under the Environment Act 2021.
**Impact**: Evidence of inadequate rationale or missing alternatives bolsters judicial review claims and could pressure DESNZ in mediation to revise the threshold.

2. **To: DESNZ Consultation Team (via EIR to foi.requests@energysecurity.gov.uk)**
**Question**: Can you provide the full dataset of stakeholder responses to the 2024 consultation on the Infrastructure Planning Order, including how responses were weighted and incorporated into the final 100MW threshold decision?
**Possible Answers**:
– Responses were received but not systematically analyzed, admitting to consultation deficiencies, supporting procedural impropriety.
– Community and small developer responses were received but given low weight compared to large developers, supporting competition law claims of market favoritism.
– No record of stakeholder weighting exists, reinforcing irrationality and illegality claims.
**Impact**: Uncovered consultation flaws strengthen judicial review arguments and provide leverage in mediation to demand transparency or revised processes.

3. **To: Planning Inspectorate Case Officer (via infrastructure.planninginspectorate.gov.uk contact form)**
**Question**: For NSIP wind and solar projects approved post-March 2025, what specific community consultation measures were required, and how were objections (e.g., noise, visual impact) addressed in decision reports?
**Possible Answers**:
– Minimal consultation was required, with objections noted but not addressed, supporting procedural impropriety and nuisance claims.
– Developers provided standard consultation reports without detailed objection resolutions, aligning with COCOO’s claims of inadequate engagement.
– No specific measures were mandated, indicating regulatory oversight failure, supporting illegality.
**Impact**: Evidence of consultation gaps or unaddressed objections strengthens tort claims (nuisance) and judicial review, aiding mediation demands for community benefit funds.

4. **To: Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) Case Officer (via casework@cma.gov.uk)**
**Question**: Has the CMA investigated or received complaints about market concentration in the UK renewable energy sector, particularly regarding the dominance of large developers like SSE and ScottishPower in NSIP projects post-March 2025?
**Possible Answers**:
– An ongoing investigation exists, confirming market distortion concerns, directly supporting COCOO’s competition law claim.
– Complaints were received but not pursued due to resource constraints, suggesting regulatory gaps, aligning with illegality claims.
– No formal complaints, but informal concerns were noted, providing grounds for COCOO to file a formal complaint.
**Impact**: Confirmation of market issues strengthens competition claims and could pressure DESNZ in mediation to address anti-competitive effects.

5. **To: SSE plc Corporate Affairs Officer (via investor.relations@sse.com)**
**Question**: What community benefit measures were implemented for your >100MW wind and solar projects approved under the NSIP regime in 2025, and how were local objections addressed?
**Possible Answers**:
– Standard benefit funds were offered but did not address specific objections (e.g., noise, shadow flicker), supporting nuisance claims.
– No tailored measures were implemented, relying on DESNZ guidance, aligning with procedural impropriety.
– Objections were dismissed as minor, reinforcing COCOO’s claims of inadequate community engagement.
**Impact**: Evidence of insufficient community benefits or objection handling strengthens tort claims and supports mediation demands for enhanced local remedies.

6. **To: CPRE Policy Director (via info@cpre.org.uk)**
**Question**: Can you provide specific data or case studies from 2025 on the loss of best and most versatile (BMV) agricultural land to solar projects and associated community impacts in rural areas like Norfolk?
**Possible Answers**:
– Data shows a 15% BMV land loss in Norfolk, with documented community complaints, directly supporting nuisance and statutory duty claims.
– Case studies highlight visual and economic impacts, reinforcing tort claims.
– Limited data exists but suggests consultation failures, supporting procedural impropriety.
**Impact**: Concrete data strengthens tort submissions and judicial review arguments, enhancing COCOO’s mediation leverage for environmental protections.

7. **To: Friends of the Earth UK Campaigns Manager (via info@foe.co.uk)**
**Question**: Have you documented specific instances of community harm (e.g., noise, shadow flicker) from wind or solar projects approved under the 2025 NSIP regime, and were these linked to inadequate consultation?
**Possible Answers**:
– Specific cases in Cumbria show noise complaints from wind turbines, supporting nuisance claims.
– Reports confirm consultation was limited, aligning with procedural impropriety.
– No direct cases but general trends of harm noted, prompting further COCOO investigation.
**Impact**: Testimonial evidence bolsters tort claims and judicial review, supporting mediation demands for community compensation.

8. **To: RenewableUK Policy Analyst (via info@renewableuk.com)**
**Question**: What proportion of >100MW wind and solar projects approved in 2025 were awarded to large developers like SSE and ScottishPower, and were smaller developers excluded due to NSIP process barriers?
**Possible Answers**:
– 70% of approvals went to large developers, with cost barriers cited for smaller firms, supporting competition claims.
– Data shows no small developer approvals, reinforcing market distortion arguments.
– Limited data on exclusions but confirms large developer dominance, prompting further inquiry.
**Impact**: Quantitative evidence strengthens competition law claims and supports mediation arguments for fairer NSIP access.

9. **To: Local Authority Planning Officer in Norfolk (via council planning contact)**
**Question**: What challenges have arisen in assessing sub-100MW wind and solar projects post-Order, and have community objections been adequately addressed in local planning decisions?
**Possible Answers**:
– Resource constraints limit assessments, with objections often sidelined, supporting procedural impropriety and nuisance claims.
– Consultation was conducted but not thorough, aligning with COCOO’s allegations.
– No significant challenges, but objections were noted, prompting COCOO to seek specific cases.
**Impact**: Evidence of local planning strain strengthens judicial review and tort claims, supporting mediation demands for better local support.

10. **To: Litigation Funder (e.g., Harbour Litigation Funding, via info@harbourlf.com)**
**Question**: What criteria would you use to assess the viability of purchasing COCOO’s judicial review and tort claims against DESNZ, and what evidence would strengthen the case’s appeal?
**Possible Answers**:
– Strong evidence of procedural flaws (e.g., consultation gaps) and market distortion (e.g., large developer dominance) is critical, aligning with COCOO’s claims.
– Community harm data and legal precedents (e.g., WildFish case) enhance viability, supporting tort and judicial review arguments.
– Financial projections of claim value are needed, prompting COCOO to quantify damages.
**Impact**: Clarifies funder interest, guiding COCOO’s evidence presentation for claim assignment and strengthening mediation leverage with a funded case.

**Possible Answers’ Role in Case Strategy**

– **Judicial Review**: Questions to DESNZ and the Planning Inspectorate could yield evidence of missing analyses, inadequate consultation, or unaddressed objections, directly supporting illegality, procedural impropriety, and irrationality claims. These strengthen COCOO’s High Court submissions and pressure DESNZ in mediation to revise the Order or enhance transparency.
– **Competition Law**: Questions to the CMA and RenewableUK could confirm market concentration, bolstering claims of anti-competitive effects under the 100MW threshold. This supports CAT filings and mediation demands for policy adjustments to level the market.
– **Tort Claims**: Questions to CPRE, Friends of the Earth, SSE, and local authorities could provide specific harm data (e.g., BMV land loss, noise complaints), strengthening nuisance and statutory duty claims. These enhance damages arguments in litigation and mediation proposals for community funds.
– **Contract and Mediation**: Responses from litigation funders clarify criteria for claim assignment, guiding COCOO’s evidence prioritization. Community and environmental data from NGOs and local authorities strengthen mediation leverage by demonstrating public interest and harm, pushing DESNZ toward settlement (e.g., revised thresholds, benefit funds).

**Recommendations for Implementation**

– **Submit Targeted Requests**: File EIRs to DESNZ for consultation and threshold data, specifying 2024–2025 records. Contact the Planning Inspectorate for NSIP consultation details and local authorities for sub-100MW project challenges.
– **Engage Stakeholders**: Reach out to CPRE and Friends of the Earth for raw data on community impacts, using cocoo.uk/windsolaruk to collect landowner testimonials. Contact RenewableUK for market share data.
– **Strengthen Legal Filings**: Incorporate responses into judicial review submissions (citing consultation gaps), CAT filings (using market data), and tort claims (with harm evidence). Reference precedents like WildFish (EWHC 2025/789) for procedural flaws.
– **Mediation Strategy**: Use evidence of procedural failures and harms to propose mediation terms, such as revising the 100MW threshold, mandating robust consultations, or establishing community benefit funds. Present to funders like Harbour to secure financing, enhancing negotiation strength.
– **Cross-Reference Sources**: Verify findings with planninginspectorate.gov.uk, RenewableUK’s database, and BAILII judgments to ensure robustness. Monitor petition.parliament.uk for new community objections to amplify public interest arguments.

To improve COCOO’s chances of success in its case against DESNZ regarding the Infrastructure Planning (Onshore Wind and Solar Generation) Order 2025, including potential litigation, contract structuring, and mediation, I reviewed the chat history and identified key areas where targeted questions could uncover critical evidence or strengthen strategic positioning. The case involves judicial review (illegality, procedural impropriety, irrationality), competition law violations under Chapter I/II of the Competition Act 1998, and tort claims (private/public nuisance, negligence, breach of statutory duty). The questions below are designed to address infringements like DESNZ’s opaque decision-making, favoritism toward large developers, inadequate consultation, and environmental harms, drawing on findings from prior searches (e.g., consultation gaps, market concentration, community objections). Each question is directed to a specific entity or individual, with possible answers that could yield evidence or clarify negotiation leverage for litigation, mediation, or contract assignment. The questions prioritize uncovering procedural flaws, market distortions, and community impacts to bolster COCOO’s legal and mediation strategies.

**Questions to Strengthen COCOO’s Case**

**Possible Answers’ Role in Case Strategy**

**Recommendations for Implementation**

SELF-QUESTIONS ON PROCUREMENT

Of course. I will now answer each of the strategic questions I created, outlining the likely responses from each party and detailing the most viable solutions and counter-moves for COCOO based on the entire history of our case analysis.

Analysing the Perpetrators’ Likely Responses

When we ask a major digital platform about adverse infringement findings in other jurisdictions, their most viable and predictable response will be to argue that the UK market has unique characteristics and that their conduct is fully compliant with UK law. They will not directly attack the European Commission, but they will seek to ring-fence the UK from other legal precedents. The most effective solution for us is not to debate this in correspondence, but to pre-emptively neutralise this defence. We must commission our economic experts to prepare a robust report demonstrating that the underlying market mechanics and anti-competitive harms are fundamentally identical across jurisdictions. This report will become a cornerstone of both our court filings and our opening position in any mediation.

When questioned about their potential financial exposure from a collective action, their public response will be a firm “no comment,” coupled with an assertion that the claim is without merit. Internally, however, they will have conducted this analysis, and the number will be a significant concern at board level. The most viable solution for us is to control the public narrative. By releasing a credible, high-level estimate of the potential damages, our campaign can fill the information vacuum, shaping investor and market perceptions of the risk and thereby increasing the internal pressure on the company to seek a more controlled, confidential settlement.

Consequently, when we probe their willingness to consider mediation, their lawyers will most likely express cautious, non-committal interest. This is the opening we need. The most viable counter-move is to immediately follow up with a formal but “without prejudice” proposal that outlines the structure of a potential mediation. This proposal will name COCOO as the uniquely qualified expert mediator and suggest a clear, time-bound process for an initial exploratory meeting, allowing us to seize the momentum and frame the subsequent negotiations. For a public body like DESNZ, when we challenge them on their admission of not assessing alternatives, they will retreat behind a wall of procedural defence, arguing their process was legally compliant. Our most potent legal strategy, therefore, is to argue that this procedural failure was so fundamental that it made a rational policy outcome impossible, thereby piercing their shield of discretionary immunity.

Analysing the Victim Class’s Likely Responses

When we ask the victim class to provide the data necessary to prove their losses, the only viable solution is to establish a secure and trusted mechanism for them to do so. Many businesses will be hesitant to share commercially sensitive data. The best solution is for COCOO to create an independent data trust, managed by a respected third-party data security firm. This firm would handle the anonymisation and aggregation of the data before it is passed to our economists, ensuring confidentiality and overcoming the primary barrier to participation.

In managing their expectations, the class will inevitably express a pragmatic desire for a fair outcome in a reasonable timeframe. The prospect of a five-year court battle is daunting. This leads directly to their likely answer to our final question: they will almost certainly prefer a hybrid solution. The most viable outcome for them is not just money, but money combined with meaningful reform. They will want a guaranteed financial settlement now, coupled with enforceable commitments from the perpetrator to change its harmful behaviour for the future. Our strategy must be to operationalise this preference by drafting a clear “Settlement Framework” early in the process, demonstrating to the class that mediation is the most effective path to achieving all of their goals.

Analysing the Regulator’s Likely Response

When we engage with the relevant regulator, they will express public confidence in their own enforcement tools but will privately acknowledge the challenges of time and resources. The most viable solution they will see in our proposal is a way to achieve their public policy objectives without a protracted and costly fight. Their most likely response will be one of cautious, informal support for our mediation efforts. To solidify this, our most viable move is to formalise our commitment to their goals. We would draft a Memorandum of Understanding with the claimant class, stating that a key objective of our mediation is to achieve a resolution that is consistent with the regulator’s public interest mandate. Sharing this with the regulator gives them the political cover to publicly describe our initiative as “constructive,” which adds enormous weight and legitimacy to our efforts and further pressures the defendant to engage seriously in the mediation.

SELF-QUESTIONS ON COMPENSATION

Responding to the Perpetrators

When we ask a major digital platform about infringement findings in other jurisdictions, their most viable public response will be to argue that the UK market is unique and that their conduct is fully compliant with UK law. They will avoid directly attacking the European Commission but will insist that its findings are not relevant. This tells us our legal case must be meticulously prepared to demonstrate that the underlying anti-competitive mechanism is identical, regardless of geography, and that the harm to UK consumers is directly analogous to the harm identified elsewhere.

When questioned on their financial exposure from a collective action, their public stance will be dismissive, stating that the claims are without merit and that they will defend their position vigorously. Internally, however, their board and legal counsel will have quantified this risk, and it will be a significant concern. Our campaign’s purpose is to amplify this internal pressure by making the litigation risk feel more acute and public, thereby making a confidential settlement a more rational business decision for them.

Consequently, when we probe their willingness to consider mediation, their most probable and strategic response, delivered through their lawyers, will be cautiously receptive. While they will never publicly admit weakness, the opportunity to enter a confidential process that allows for creative commercial solutions, avoids years of negative headlines, and caps their financial risk is an immensely attractive alternative to a high-stakes court battle. The most viable solution for them is to agree to an exploratory, without-prejudice discussion. Our immediate goal is to trigger this discussion. For a government body like DESNZ, when confronted with their admission of not assessing alternatives, their most viable defence will be to argue that their process met all necessary statutory requirements and that courts should afford them a wide margin of discretion on policy. Our Judicial Review must therefore prove that their procedural failure was so fundamental that it rendered the entire process irrational and unlawful, piercing this veil of discretionary immunity.

Responding to the Victim Class

When we ask the class of victims—be they developers, consumers, or investors—to provide the data needed to quantify their losses, the only viable solution is for them to collectively agree to pool their anonymised data for analysis by our appointed economic experts. Without this, any claim for damages will fail at the certification stage. Our role is to act as the trusted intermediary to facilitate this confidential data-sharing and to commission the expert analysis that will form the backbone of their financial claim.

In managing their expectations about the length and risk of litigation, the most common and pragmatic response will be a desire for a fair outcome achieved in a reasonable timeframe. While the desire for justice is strong, the prospect of a five-year legal battle with an uncertain result will temper this. This prepares the ground for our core strategic question: what does the best outcome look like? The most viable solution, and the one most likely to be embraced by the majority of the class, is a hybrid outcome. They will want fair financial compensation for the harm they have suffered, but they will also place immense value on a settlement that includes forward-looking, enforceable commitments from the perpetrator to change their harmful business practices for the future. This confirms that our mediation strategy, which can deliver both money and reform, is perfectly aligned with the class’s most probable and desired outcome.

Engaging with the Regulator

When we engage with a regulator like the CMA, their initial public position will be one of confidence in their own formal enforcement tools. However, in a private, strategic discussion, they will acknowledge the challenges of lengthy investigations and appeals. When we present our mediation model as an alternative, their most viable and likely response will be one of cautious, informal support. They cannot officially outsource their enforcement duties, but they will recognise the immense value in a process that can achieve their public policy objectives—such as fostering a more competitive market or establishing a new code of conduct—far more quickly and without depleting their own resources. The optimal solution for the regulator is to allow our expert-led mediation to proceed, monitor its progress, and potentially adopt its outcome as the basis for formally closing their own investigation. Our strategy, therefore, is to position COCOO not as a rival to the regulator, but as a specialist partner that can facilitate a faster, more comprehensive, and more efficient resolution for the entire market.

MEDIATION

Of course. Having analysed the new materials on mediation and alternative dispute resolution, we can now pivot our strategy. Instead of using pressure to create a procurement need for our advisory services, we will use it to create an urgent need for expert-led mediation, positioning COCOO as the indispensable neutral party to resolve the complex disputes we have uncovered.

Part 1: The New Unsolicited Proposal: COCOO as the Expert Mediator

Our new Unsolicited Proposal will be directed at all principal parties involved in a given dispute—for example, to the Department for Energy Security & Net Zero, renewable energy developers, and community stakeholders simultaneously. It will reframe COCOO’s role from protagonist to a neutral, expert facilitator.

The core of our proposal is that we are not a generic mediator, but a Specialist Mediator for Complex Regulatory and Competition Disputes. Our unique value is threefold. Firstly, we possess unparalleled subject-matter expertise. Unlike traditional mediators who must spend months learning the technical background, we already have a deep, granular understanding of the economics of digital platforms, the intricacies of energy regulation, and the specific anti-competitive harms at play. Secondly, we have a holistic view of the entire dispute landscape. We understand the government’s political pressures, the corporation’s commercial imperatives, and the specific grievances of the businesses and consumers who have been harmed. Finally, this unique position grants us the ability to act as a highly efficient and effective neutral. Our previous investigations have equipped us to understand every party’s legitimate interests, allowing us to bypass adversarial posturing and focus immediately on finding a mutually acceptable resolution.

Part 2: The New Strategy: From Creating a “Problem” to Engineering a “Resolution Pathway”

Our campaign’s objective now shifts from highlighting a single party’s failure to demonstrating that the entire dispute is becoming an intractable and costly stalemate for everyone involved. The goal is to make a negotiated settlement, facilitated by an expert mediator, the most rational path forward for all sides.

First, our public campaign and private briefings will frame the dispute as unwinnable through traditional means. For the digital platforms case, we will emphasise to both sides that a multi-year collective action lawsuit will incur millions in legal fees with a highly uncertain outcome, all while damaging business relationships. For the DESNZ case, we will highlight that a prolonged Judicial Review creates a “lose-lose” scenario: the government faces years of uncertainty in meeting its Net Zero targets, while developers are unable to invest due to the unstable planning environment.

Next, our outreach will focus on generating a multi-stakeholder demand for mediation. We will approach the general counsel of the corporate defendants, arguing that a confidential mediation offers a swift, off-ramp to a major legal and reputational crisis. Simultaneously, we will explain to the claimants—the developers and consumer groups—that mediation can deliver faster and more creative solutions, such as changes to a platform’s rules or a new community benefit fund, which a court cannot order. We will also engage the relevant regulator, arguing that an expert-led mediation can achieve their public policy objectives far more efficiently than a protracted enforcement battle.

Finally, once all parties recognise that litigation is a mutually destructive path, we will formally present COCOO’s mediation service as the only viable way forward. We will leverage the clear policy direction from government and EU bodies, evidenced by the e-consumer and online dispute resolution platforms you highlighted, to show that ADR is the preferred method for resolving complex disputes in the public interest.

Part 3: The Content of Our Mediation Proposal

Our formal proposal to all parties will define the problem not as one side’s fault, but as a “multi-party regulatory and commercial dispute whose complexity is ill-suited to the adversarial nature of litigation.” We will propose a “Structured Expert Mediation Process” led by COCOO. The proposal will explicitly state that in this capacity, COCOO will act as a strictly neutral facilitator, with our prior research positioned as the “investigative phase” that uniquely qualifies us to now guide the parties to a resolution.

The proposal will outline a clear process: confidential pre-mediation briefings with each party to understand their core interests, joint sessions to establish common ground, and private caucuses to explore creative solutions. It will state that our objective is to facilitate a comprehensive, forward-looking settlement agreement that provides certainty for all parties, saves enormous legal costs, and restores market stability, achieving a superior outcome for everyone than years of costly and uncertain court proceedings.

frame our Unique Selling Propositions in a way that is persuasive and aligns with our charitable status, our need to cover operational expenses, and our intellectual property considerations. I’ve noted that COCOO operates as a charity, seeking only to cover expenses, which can include my legal fees, and that there’s an existing mechanism for managing certain project costs, such as the reference to a low-value contract framework in Spain up to 15,000 Euros. This latter point might illustrate our experience in managing cost-effective engagements.

Before I outline the redrafted USP proposals, I must mention that I do not have access to the “new attachments” you referred to, specifically the “MODEL CONTRACT OFFERINGS.” Therefore, I cannot tailor these USPs to any specific details within those model contracts. However, I will proceed based on the information you’ve provided and our previous discussions.

The following USP proposals are drafted for our internal strategy, focusing on how we might articulate COCOO’s value to a government body to encourage a direct engagement, bypassing a public tender, by highlighting the unique benefits and risk mitigation we offer.

Our first key selling proposition is COCOO’s development of a highly specialized and proprietary strategic framework for addressing [mention the specific area of concern/project, e.g., “effective energy policy implementation” or “consumer protection in regulated industries”]. This isn’t just a collection of ideas; it’s a documented, structured methodology, the expression of which is protected by copyright. We only disclose the workings of this framework under a Non-Disclosure Agreement, ensuring its integrity and our unique position in applying it. This exclusivity means the government would be accessing a tested solution that isn’t available elsewhere, immediately positioning COCOO as a unique partner rather than one of many potential bidders.

Secondly, engaging with COCOO offers the government a proactive route to mitigate significant legal and operational risks. Our proprietary framework has been designed specifically to navigate complex regulatory landscapes and preempt potential challenges, including those that might otherwise lead to costly and protracted litigation or public criticism. By adopting our proven approach, the government can demonstrate due diligence and robust decision-making, thereby safeguarding its initiatives against future legal vulnerabilities. This isn’t about us initiating legal action; it’s about the government leveraging our unique expertise to prevent such issues arising from other quarters, an opportunity they would gain by partnering with us directly and efficiently.

Thirdly, our status as a charity dedicated to the public good, combined with our operational model of only recovering legitimate and pre-agreed expenses, presents unparalleled value for money. The government would be securing access to highly specialized expertise and a unique strategic solution without incurring the premium costs typically associated with commercial consultancies. Our existing protocols for managing project expenses, possibly exemplified by frameworks like the low-value contract mechanism you mentioned, demonstrate our commitment to transparency and cost-efficiency. This makes a direct award not only strategically sound but also economically prudent for the government, ensuring public funds are used effectively to achieve vital policy objectives.

Finally, COCOO’s deep understanding and existing intellectual capital in this specific domain mean we are uniquely and immediately ready to implement solutions. The time, resources, and potential risks associated with bringing another party up to speed, or developing a comparable solution from scratch, would be substantial. A public tender process itself could delay crucial action. By engaging COCOO directly, the government can leverage an existing, refined, and protected solution, ensuring rapid and effective deployment, which is often critical for pressing public interest matters. Our sole ability to deploy this copyrighted and confidentially managed strategic framework makes us the only viable entity to deliver these specific outcomes efficiently.

These propositions, when communicated effectively, should help to build a compelling case for a direct engagement, emphasizing COCOO’s unique capabilities, our risk-mitigation benefits for the government, our cost-effective charitable model, and the protections afforded by our intellectual property and NDAs.

Our Ref: DESNZ.WIND.SOLAR.RESPONSE.250605

Your Ref: TOB2025/06709

STRICTLY BY EMAIL ONLY

A. Collins

DESNZ Correspondence Unit

Department for Energy Security & Net Zero

55 Whitehall

London

SW1A 2HP

5 June 2025

Dear A. Collins,

Subject: Your Letter of 21 May 2025 Regarding Infrastructure Planning (Onshore Wind and Solar Generation) Order 2025

We acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 21 May 2025 (your ref: TOB2025/06709), responding to our email of 23 April 2025 concerning the Infrastructure Planning (Onshore Wind and Solar Generation) Order 2025.

While we appreciate you taking the time to outline the Department’s general position on the Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects (NSIP) regime and the rationale for the aforementioned Order, your letter does not address the substantive issues raised in our formal Internal Review Request (IRR) submitted on 16 May 2025.

Your letter notes that “the Department has received a separate FOI request from your organisation” and assures a response will follow. ² For clarity, our original correspondence of 23 April 2025 was indeed an information request (Ref: EIR2025/06552). The Department’s Renewable Electricity Directorate provided a response to this on 15 May 2025. It was this response from the Renewable Electricity Directorate that COCOO found to be unsatisfactory, leading to our submission of a formal Internal Review Request on 16 May 2025. ³ This IRR details our specific points of dissatisfaction regarding the failure to provide specific recorded information.

Your letter outlines the perceived benefits and processes of the NSIP regime, such as creating a “level playing field” ⁵, streamlining consenting ⁶, and ensuring decisions are made in accordance with National Policy Statements (NPSs) which set “stringent requirements to protect the environment”. ⁷ You also state that the NSIP regime is “not a mechanism to bypass local democracy” and offers engagement opportunities. ⁸ Furthermore, you assert that the 100MW threshold for onshore wind and solar ensures only the “largest and most important projects” enter the NSIP regime.

However, these general assertions do not address the core of our Internal Review Request. For instance:

Policy Balancing: Our IRR seeks “all recorded information… that document the Department’s explicit consideration and balancing of these competing policy objectives and statutory duties during the formulation of the Infrastructure Planning (Onshore Wind and Solar Generation) Order 2025.” ¹⁰ Your reference to NPSs ¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹ and the assertion that developers “will continue to be required to show how their application meets legal and regulatory requirements” ¹² is noted. However, the DESNZ response dated 15 May 2025 merely pointed to updated NPSs then under consultation ¹³¹³¹³¹³, which we deemed insufficient as it did not provide specific internal recorded analyses for this Order.
Consideration of Alternatives: Our IRR questions the thoroughness of the evaluation of alternatives. ¹⁵¹⁵¹⁵¹⁵ While the DESNZ response of 15 May 2025 pointed to an impact assessment ¹⁶¹⁶¹⁶¹⁶, it also admitted that “the government has not conducted specific analysis to test alternatives that might have had lesser impacts on local democracy or sensitive landscapes.” ¹⁷¹⁷¹⁷¹⁷ This admission is significant ¹⁸ and is a key point of our IRR.
Reasoning and Evidence Base for Thresholds: Your letter states the 100MW threshold ensures only genuinely nationally significant projects enter the NSIP regime. ²⁰ Our IRR, however, requests “any underlying studies, datasets, or specific evidential documents that informed the rationale and selection of the 100MW thresholds, beyond the summary presented in the IA.” ²¹ The previous DESNZ response directed us to the Impact Assessment ²²²²²²²², but it remains unclear if this contains the entirety of the evidence base.
Consultation Responses: Your letter mentions that the NSIP regime has engagement opportunities. ²⁴ Our IRR specifically requests “recorded information (e.g., internal minutes, briefing notes to ministers, schedules of consideration) that demonstrates the actual process of how… specific concerns [from consultation responses] were deliberated upon and weighed in the decision-making process for the Order,” ²⁵ as a public summary of responses does not reveal these internal processes. ²⁶ The previous DESNZ response indicated that “The government has not produced a summary of consultation responses per stakeholder type per view of each individual issue raised” ²⁷²⁷²⁷²⁷, which we are pursuing further in our IRR.
Compliance with Statutory Duties: Your letter references NPSs setting requirements to protect the environment. ²⁹ Our IRR reiterates a request for “any specific recorded assessment(s)… undertaken to ensure this specific Order and its provisions comply with the UK’s statutory duties regarding environmental protection and sustainable development before it was laid.” ³⁰ The previous DESNZ response, again, referred generally to NPSs ³¹³¹³¹³¹, which we found insufficient.

COCOO maintains all accusations and concerns that underpinned our original information request and subsequent Internal Review Request. ³³ Our IRR (Ref: DESNZ.WIND.SOLAR) was submitted to the DESNZ Information Rights Team (FOI.Requests@energysecurity.gov.uk) on 16 May 2025, as per the appeals procedure outlined in the response from the Renewable Electricity Directorate.

We trust that the Department’s Information Rights Team is processing our Internal Review Request dated 16 May 2025 and will provide a full, substantive response addressing each of the specific points of dissatisfaction and requests for information contained therein within the statutory timeframe of 20 working days. ³⁵ Your letter refers us to a consultation response summary and an impact assessment for the Order ³⁶; these documents were already referenced by the Renewable Electricity Directorate in its 15 May response and were found insufficient for the reasons detailed in our IRR.

We look forward to the comprehensive response to our Internal Review Request from the appropriate team within DESNZ.

Yours sincerely,

Oscar Moya LLedo

In-House Solicitor (SRA n. 333300)

For and on behalf of Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO)

contact@cocoo.uk

23 Village Way, Beckenham, BR3 3NA, United Kingdom 38

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